There are parallels on the use of firepower between the fight around Khe Sanh in early 1968 and the use in Afghanistan in 2001/2002.  In both cases there were soldiers or Marines on the ground to assist in the fixing of the enemy force and the delivery of munitions to destroy it.  In Afghanistan the Special Forces working with the Northern Alliance tracked and designated the targets for attack by accurately delivered aerial ordnance.  At Khe Sanh the Marines and soldiers provided the fixing force for the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) by making themselves subject to attack.  Sensors were deployed that detected the NVA and by integrating multiple sensor inputs the fire support coordinators could predict where the enemy force would be at any given time.  This "tracking" and templating allowed for the NVA formations to be attacked before they could launch a serious ground attack.  The sensors used at Khe Sanh had originally been earmarked for the McNamara line--a line of sensors, barbed wire, mines and firebases that was going to extend along the DMZ to Laos.  In Laos the sensors and aerial detection platforms would be linked with attack aircraft.

In the winter of 1968 the NVA launched Phase II of its "General Offensive-General Uprising."  In January, when the McNamara Line should have become operational, it became clear that the North Vietnamese were massing around the combat base at Khe Sanh in the northwestern corner of South Vietnam.  General Westmoreland was going to get the firepower fight around Khe Sanh that he wanted.  All the sensors and related equipment slated to be installed along the DMZ as part of the McNamara Line were allocated instead to the defenders of Khe Sanh.  Seismic and acoustic sensors were quickly dropped on likely enemy approaches by aircraft of the 7th Air Force. Almost immediately the sensors began indicating enemy activity. 

The key to the use of the sensor data was to use it to predict where an enemy force would be at a given time.  The enemy was tracked and while the tracking occurred plans were developed to engage them at a predicted point and time.  This process required multiple sensors and in some cases observers to verify the predictions.  This also gave rise to the use of templating--knowing the enemy's doctrine and force structure predicting where the unlocated part of the force would be.  Templating is the process of converting enemy doctrine or patterns of operation to graphics (doctrinal templates). Doctrinal templates convert threat order battle (OB) data into graphics that show how the threat might deploy their forces according to doctrine and training without the constraints of weather and terrain.  The analyst can then adjust enemy locations to fit the terrain and then target it.  This is the precise effort that was done at Khe Sanh.   Once the targeting was done the next step was to get the aircraft on target.  This was done using radar control to vector the aircraft to the predetermined points and then to engage the targets.  It was possible to divert aircraft quickly form one target or location as the intelligence picture became clearer.  Classical artillery time-on-target techniques were also used.

In April 1968 the siege at Khe Sanh finally ended.  The sensors deployed there became objects of great praise. Colonel David Lownds, the Marine commander at the Combat Base, said, "I think the casualties would have almost doubled" without the sensors.  One of the analysts who had developed the concept of the McNamara Line was less modest in his praise of sensor technology.  Physicist Kenneth Case from the University of California San Diego claimed that the sensors indicated when the enemy were massing for attacks against the base, allowing the Base defenders to carefully orchestrate the use of artillery and airpower, which destroyed them. "That's how the Marines got out of Khe Sanh," according to Case.

Sensor technology may have saved those of us at Khe Sanh, but Khe Sanh effectively stopped further construction on the McNamara Line. The defenders at Khe Sanh did not face the NVA across the broad, linear front that was envisioned by the McNamara Line.   Two divisions of NVA surrounded the Combat Base.  The experience with sensor technology demonstrated that it worked in 360-degree applications when deployed in depth to allow for tracking and templating.  Brush suggests that "There was no compelling evidence that the barrier technique would work in a linear application as envisioned by the McNamara plan." 

The Afghanistan experience has been similar. There was a fixing force to prevent the opposition from being able to move undetected.  The fixing force was not made of conventional US Forces--except in Operation Anaconda.  The force was local militia supported by US Special Forces.  Using modern communications and target designation technology it was possible to vector on station aircraft on to targets in near real time.  To the extent that templating was done it was based upon the local warriors' knowledge of the enemy.  Since there was no artillery deployed to support the ground forces they were dependent upon aerial delivered munitions.  Fortunately, there have not been any incidents reported of there being insufficient resources to deal with all available targets when needed.  It is easy to imagine, however, conditions under which such a situation could arise.

The major difference is that the Taliban military retreated and surrendered.  This caused a rapid downfall of the Taliban regime.  Conversely, the "agony of Khe Sanh" played on the screens and front pages of the United States for 77 days.  At Khe Sanh the enemy had the initiative and the US was reacting to its actions.  The sensors were positioned on likely avenues of approach and if the enemy used different routes there was always the risk that they would not be detected.  This may have required the 5000 troops deployed to Khe Sanh to defend against sensor gaps.  The opposite was the case in Afghanistan.  The mobility of the Special Forces and the presence of anti-Taliban forces allowed a much smaller US force to maintain the initiative and thus win the battles and the war.  In Vietnam, the US eventually won the battle around Khe Sanh, but the NVA continued to fight for 7 more years until they had won the war.  The difference was thus one of political motivations and objectives, not military activity. 

The use of mobile forces on the ground coupled with responsive firepower and clear political goals seems to be the ingredient for success in battle.  Mobile forces that can deliver accurate firepower can gain and maintain the initiative in pursuit of clear objectives.
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1.  Peter Brush, The Story Behind the McNamara Line."  Also reprinted as Next Page