numerically smaller, but better lead, trained and equipped force maneuvering for strategic advantage so as to "win" with minimal casualties, will be the warfare of the future. Mass will be achieved by fires and movement over much larger areas by numerically smaller forces.   This warfare of maneuver will be focused on strategic objectives. It is critical to again note, at this juncture, that every battle and action should contribute to the achievement of the political objective.
How is this different from what characterized war in the 20th Century?  As the US military's movement into the digital world and the call for missile defense illustrates, weapons will be more sophisticated, and probably less plentiful for those with the means to produce and operate them.  Systems will be less plentiful because of unit costs of the technology.  This suggests that attrition is a losing strategy because each loss will have a more dramatic impact on overall capability.  Conversely, less sophisticated weapons will proliferate with less sophisticated states and others.  The reader must remember that the nation states may not be the only warriors.  Independent actors such as the militants in the Philippines or Hamas in the MiddleEast are examples of non nation state actors. Conflicts with non-nation state actors makes the entire nature of the conflict more difficult because changing the objectives of those not empowered to do so will be more difficult, because the leaders of such organizations do not have decisive authority over the state or some cases even their own warriors.  This means that attrition warfare may be critical--just the opposite of what technology offers. It is also important to remember that culture and deep seeded objectives may make what we perceive to be rational irrational.  This suggests that the Socio-Psychological means will be more important as such groups must be discredited.  The Socio Psychological targets will be attacked using attrition weaponry and the tools of information warfare. 
The sophistication of weaponry is the first of several asymmetries that will increase in the 21st century.
The Three Days of War
During the Cold War some strategists talked about the three days of war:

  • The day before--when deterrence of conflict is the goal and diplomacy, economic and social psychological means are being used to achieve national objectives.  Military threats may be used to further in the achievement of the political objectives.
  • The day of war--deterrence, to include deployments and other shows of force have failed and armed conflict has begun.
  • The day after--victory has been achieved--political objectives have been changed to accommodate the victor and efforts are undertaken to insure that the seeds of the next conflict are not planted.
The asymmetries of future war may become most obvious during the time continuum defined by these three days of war.
Asymmetries
The Gulf War and other skirmishes around the world have demonstrated that no one can challenge the US in late 20th Century forms of warfare.  Why would an opponent choose to challenge the US where its strengths lie?  Therefore, we should expect that enemies will seek asymmetric approaches to warfare.  As suggested earlier in the discussion of low-tech mass vice high tech limited quantity, the US must remain capable of combating low-tech weapons being used to create causalities for their psychological value.  Future opponents understand the US aversion to causalities and the public expectation that causalities will be minimal.  They must be expected to wage hands on war--use of terrorist and unconventional attacks to try and create causalities.  They also should be expected to reduce their own vulnerabilities by hiding in urban sprawl, dispersing to avoid creating lucrative targets and avoiding certain forms of communication that might be vulnerable.  The extent that they perceive that their vulnerabilities have been negated, the more willing they may be to transition from the day before to the day of war.
There are other asymmetries that should be considered.  At the tactical level complex terrain will be sought to reduce technology's ability to find and target the enemy. Continued.